University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review

1977

The Federal Fetal Experimentation Regulations: An
Establishment Clause Analysis
Jane M. Friedman

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Friedman, Jane M., "The Federal Fetal Experimentation Regulations: An Establishment Clause Analysis" (1977). Minnesota Law
Review. 1580.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/1580

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

The Federal Fetal Experimentation
Regulations: An Establishment
Clause Analysis
Jane M. Friedman*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION

------................-........---

-

-

962

H. HISTORY AND DESCRIPTION OF FETAL EXPERIMENTATION POLICY AND REGULATION ---963
A. FEDERAL REGULATION PRIOR TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION -.---------963
1.
2.
3.

The Absence of Pre-1973 Regulation
963
The 1973 and 1974 Regulations
-...............
966
The Function and Structure of the National
Commission
- -----967

B. THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION

-..........-- ------------...............---------

C. THE CURRENT LAW-THE FEDERAL REGULATIONS
OF 19 7 5

969

. .... ......
............
....................
...........970

1. The Substantive Provisions - ----------------970
2.

The Ethical Advisory Boards .........................- 973
a. Rulemaking Powers
-.......----------------------- 973
b. Advisory Powers
-.........---------------......
974

c. Adjudicatory Powers-The Waiver

Provision
.-...-.-.-...
-.. ..........
974
III. AN ESTABLSHMENT CLAUSE ANALYSIS -----.--- 976
A. INTRODUCTION ....-.-.-.--..
------------.
976
B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOUR FACTORSTHE GOVERNING CASES------------977

C. APPLICATION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE TEST
TO THE FEDERAL FETAL EXPERIMENTATION

----985
Governmental Sanction of a Moral Precept
that is not Buttressed by any Societal
Consensus -.--------.............-------------------------985
2. The Coercive Impact of the Regulations
986
3. Evidence of Strong Religious Pressures for
Enactment of the Law -----.-................-------------987
a. The Reports of the Commission's Scientific Consultants - ...................................
989
b. The Writings and Recommendations of
the Commission's Ethical Consultants __
991
(1) The Fetal Personhood Premise ------.991
(2) The Immorality of Abortion
993
Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. The

REGULATIONS

1.

*

author is grateful for the thorough and thoughtful research assistance of

Ms. Vicki Baer, J.D., 1977, Wayne State University Law School.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
(3)

[Vol. 61:961

The Guiding Spirit-Judeo-Christian
994

Tradition

4. A Search for an Extrinsic Secular Purpose
a.

-

998
998

The "Domino Effect"

b. Preserving a Woman's Right to Change
Her Decision to Undergo an Induced
1000
Abortion
1004
IV. CONCLUSION ----------------------I. INTRODUCTION
In 1973 in Roe v. Wade' the Supreme Court declared that
the unborn are not included in the constitutional definition of
person. In spite of that decision, or perhaps as a direct result
of it, biomedical experiments utilizing fetuses or fetal tissue continue to be controversial. 2 Participants in the debate over fetal
research3 include theologians and other "religious ethicists," 4 the
legislatures of sixteen states,5 the United States Congress,6 a federal advisory commission,7 and, on three occasions, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW).8
Under the current HEW fetal experimentation regulations 9
the Secretary is virtually precluded from funding any biomedical
research project that uses the fetus as an experimental object,
either before, during, or after an abortion. Although technically
applicable only to HEW-funded research,' which comprises more
than 62 percent of all federally-funded research and more than
40 percent of all biomedical research in the United States," the
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. In an article describing the debate over fetal experimentation,
Dr. Willard Gaylin and Dr. Marc Lapp6 coined the phrase "fetal politics." See Gaylin & Lapp6, Fetal Politics, ATLANTic MONTHLY, May
1975, at 66.
3. For a description of the kinds of fetal research that have been
conducted and the results that have been obtained, see REPORT OF THE
BiaMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH 7-15 (1975), reprinted in part at
40 Fed. Reg. 33,530 (1975) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION REPORT];
NATIONAL CoMIussIoN FOR THE PROTEcTION or HUMAN SUBJEcTS OF

Note, Fetal Experimentation: Moral, Legal, and Medical Implications,
26 STAN. L. REV. 1191, 1192-97 (1974).
4. See, e.g., P. RAMSEY, THE ETHcs OF

FETAL

RESEARCH (1975);

Walters, Ethical Issues in Experimentation on the Human Fetus, 2 J. RELicious ETmcs 33 (1975).
5. See note 202 infra.
6. See National Research Service Award Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-348, tit. 2, §§ 201-205, 88 Stat. 348; notes 32-33 infra and accompanying text.
7. See notes 33-50 infra, and accompanying text.
8. See text accompanying notes 29-31 & 51-84 infra.

9. 40 Fed. Reg. 33,528 (1975), 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.201-.211 (1976).
10. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.201 (a), .301 (1976).
11. Letter from Richard W. Turlington, Chief of Office of Grant Inquiries, Division of Research Grants, National Institutes of Health, to author (Aug. 18, 1975) (on file with the author).
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regulations, as an official statement of federal policy, will undoubtedly have great influence on other granting agencies, both
12
public and private.'
Paradoxically, the federal government admits that fetal research has been indispensable to numerous biomedical advances,
and that had such research been proscribed in the past, progress
in diagnosing, preventing, and treating many pernicious diseases
13
would have been "significantly delayed or halted indefinitely."'
It is the thesis of this Article that in making fetal experimentation taboo, the federal government is acting not only
irrationally but also unconstitutionally. Because the current
restrictions are the product of an essentially religious dispute
concerning fetal status-a controversy that the federal government has "resolved" in favor of the fundamentalist JudeoChristian premise of fetal personhood14-and because there is
no extrinsic secular justification' 5 for the broad restrictions, the
regulations violate the first amendment's prohibition of governmental establishment of religion.
II. HISTORY AND DESCRIPTION OF FETAL
EXPERIMENTATION POLICY AND
REGULATION
A.

FEDERAL REGULATION PRIOR TO THE REcOMMENDATIONS OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION

The pre-1975 history of federal fetal experimentation policy
has been recounted elsewhere. 16 This portion of the Article will
briefly summarize only those events that are not discussed in
the other published historical accounts.
1.

The Absence of Pre-1973 Regulation

This author has been unable to find any evidence of legislation or regulation directed specifically at fetal experimentation
before April 1973. Indeed, as recently as 1972, the federal gov12. This has certainly been the case with respect to HEW regulations regarding funding of other controversial scientific endeavors. For
example, the HEW regulations governing recombinant DNA research,
41 Fed. Reg. 27,902 (1976), have been formally adopted by the American
Cancer Society, the National Science Foundation, and several other
private and public funding agencies. Private communication from Dr.
David Jackson, Associate Professor of Microbiology, University of Michigan, to author (Aug. 8, 1977).
13. CoMlIssIoN REPORT, supra note 3, at 24.
14. See notes 167-80 infra and accompanying text.
15. See notes 183-202 infra and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., RAMSzy, supra note 4; Note, supra note 3, at 1197-203.
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ernment's policy was described as follows: "Scientific studies of
the human fetus are an integral and necessary part of research
concerned with the health of women and children."'17 Exactly
one year later, however, an official of the National Institutes of
Health (NIH) 18 announced a radical change of position: "The
NIH does not now support research on live aborted human
fetuses, and does not contemplate approving the support of such
research . . . . We know of no circumstances at present or in
NIH support of rethe foreseeable future which would justify
19
search on live aborted human fetuses."'
What had happened in the interim, of course, was the
Supreme Court's abortion decision in Roe v. Wade,2 0 which caused
anti-abortionists to lobby strongly for measures ensuring that the
"permissive abortion atmosphere" 2' 1 would not lead the government to give its imprimatur to the use of the aborted fetus as an
experimental research object. 22 Dr. Mark Frankel, a political
17. Ob-Gyn News, Apr. 15, 1973, at 56.
18. The National Institutes of Health is a unit within the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.
19. Statement of Dr. Robert Betliner, NIH Deputy Director of Science, quoted in Health Agencies Ponder Research on Human Ethics,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1973, at 20, col. 3. The statement was read by
Dr. Charles Lowe at a meeting which was attended by several antiabortion groups. For the background of this statement, see notes 130-31
infra and accompanying text.
20. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The precise legal relevance of the abortion decision for the issue of fetal research is not clear. The Court
stated in Roe that the interest of the woman in deciding whether to
bear a child or terminate her pregnancy was an element of the right
to privacy. Id. at 152-54. In a balance between her interest and the
interest of the state-which the Court identified as the interest in protecting potential life-the woman's right prevails in the first trimester. The
state's interest becomes stronger as the pregnancy continues, however,
and becomes "compelling" at the point of viability. Id. at 163. Neither
of these interests is affected by research using fetuses. Certainly, so
long as a woman's right to have an abortion within the Roe guidelines
is not interfered with, her privacy interests are not infringed by any restriction on fetal research. The non-viable fetus of a woman who has
chosen to have an abortion or the non-viable abortus by definition have
no potential for life; thus there is nothing for the state to protect. See
Note, supra note 3, at 1205. For a discussion of other interests that the
state may raise in support of restrictions on fetal research, see notes
183-202 infra and accompanying text.
21. Press Release, U.S. Catholic Conference, quoted in Health
Agencies Ponder Research on Human Ethics, N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1973,
at 20, col. 3.
22. The assumption that liberalized abortion laws would provide
scientists with a heretofore unavailable supply of fetuses for research,
see, e.g., Note, supra note 3, at 1191, has been disputed by one commentator. He points out that even before Roe v. Wade, there was no shortage
of subjects for those few scientists trained and interested in fetal re-
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scientist who has studied the history and politics of the antifetal research movement 2 3 has given the following account of
the relationship between Roe v. Wade and national fetal experimentation policy:
The reaction to the [Roe and Doe24] rulings reflected the
narrow division of public opinion on legalized abortion. 25 Proponents of abortion hailed it as a "tremendous victory," while
anti-abortion groups promised to "work with more vigor than
ever" to overturn the Court's decisions. 26 Anti-abortionists soon

launched a massive campaign aimed at mobilizing enough support to cause the reversal of the Supreme Court's rulings. As
part of that campaign, a number of proposals were introduced
in Congress that would have either imposed an absolute ban on
abortion or permitted the 2states
to regulate abortion in any
7
manner they judged proper.
With only slow and piecemeal success in their efforts to steer

anti-abortion legislation through Congress, it is not surprising
search. He also notes that the prevalence of early abortion has actually

decreased the availability of the relatively large, intact, living, but nonviable fetuses used, for example, in projects studying the feasibility of

transplanting fetal organs. Levine, The Impact on Fetal Research of the

Report of the National Commission for the Protectionof Human Subjects
of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 22 VILL. L. REV. 367, 370 (1977).
23. See M. Frankel, The Politics of Human Research (May 1, 1977)
(unpublished manuscript). Dr. Frankel is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Wayne State University.
24. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), was a companion case to
Roe v. Wade (footnote added).
25. A Gallup Poll taken in the month before the Supreme Court's
rulings found the public to be almost evenly divided on the issue, with
46 percent in favor, 45 percent opposed, and 9 percent undecided. Washington Post, Jan. 28, 1973, § A, at 5, col. 2. (footnote in original;
renumbered).

26. Abortion Backers Hail Ruling; Foes Pledge Continued Fight,
Washington Post, Jan. 23, 1973, § A, at 2, col. 4. (footnote in original;
renumbered).
27. During the 1973 congressional session more than thirty pieces
of legislation relating directly to abortion were introduced. See J. SARGENT, THE ABORTION

CONTROVERSY:

LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL AcTIoNs

FOLLOWING THE SUPREME COURT'S INVALIDATION OF RESTRICTIONS UPON Ac-

CESS To ABORTIONS: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION (1974); U.S. COMM'N
ON CIVIL RIGHTS, CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE RIGHT TO LIMIT CHILDBEARING (1975)
[hereinafter cited as RIGHT TO LIMIT CHILDBEARING].
(footnote in original; renumbered).
By no means has the controversy Dr. Frankel discussed abated.
Anti-abortionists won significant victories in three recent Supreme
Court decisions. In Beal v. Doe, 97 S. Ct. 2366 (1977), the Court held
that Title IX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq. (Medicaid), does not require participating states to fund "nontherapeutic"
abortions. In a companion case, Maher v. Roe, 97 S. Ct. 2376 (1977),
the Court also held that state regulations prohibiting such funding do
not deny Medicaid recipients equal protection of the law and do not
unduly burden their exercise of the fundamental right to seek an abortion. Finally, In Poelker v. Doe, 97 S. Ct. 2391 (1977), the Court ruled
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that anti-abortionists latched on to the fetal research controversy
as a complementary means for achieving their objective. The
strategy of anti-abortion groups was to establish the fetus as a
person with full legal rights. If it was determined that a fetus
was a "person" for the purposes of medical research, that would
be one step closer to judging the fetus to be a "person" in the
context of abortion. This position was the crucial link between
the anti-abortion movement and fetal research. Once the fetus
was legally recognized as a person, then a total ban on abortion
might soon follow. As the nation debated the issues, the arguments surrounding abortion and fetal research became caught up
in a funnel of confusion. Distinctions between the two issues
were often ignored, if not purposely blurred. It is against this
background that NIH
and congressional activity can be more
28
clearly understood.
2.

The 1973 and 1974 Regulations

In response to pressure from anti-abortion groups, HEW
promulgated regulations in November 1973, that virtually prohibited HEW-supported scientists from engaging in any nontherapeutic2 9 experimentation that employed the fetus as a
that it does not deny equal protection for city-owned hospitals to provide
facilities and services for childbirth while refusing to provide facilities
and services for "nontherapeutic" abortions.
28. Frankel, supra note 23, at 211-13. Dr. Charles Lowe, the official
who announced the NIH policy shift, see note 19 supra, subsequently admitted that the government's anti-fetal experimentation stance was primarily a response to the lobbying efforts of anti-abortionists, noting that
after Roe v. Wade
[a] whole series of bills introduced in Congress . . . seemed to
have the intention of prohibiting fetal research, hoping that the
net effect would be a reduction in the number of abortions performed in this country. Somehow certain legislators seemed to
become convinced that fetal research encouraged abortion, and
that curtailing fetal research would diminish the number of
abortions.
Lowe, On Legislating Fetal Research, in GENurIcs AND THE LAW 352-54
(A. Milunsky & G. Annas eds. 1976) (emphasis added).
Another recent commentator has made a similar observation about
the connection between the anti-abortion lobby and the move to limit
fetal experimentation:
Once the opponents of abortion lost political control over the
abortion procedure, even in those states where they believed that
they held a majority, only one avenue was left open to thema constitutional amendment that would limit the practice. To
accomplish such an amendment in the face of determined liberal
opposition would necessarily require neutralization of any general societal gains from the procedure. Research on the aboutto-be-aborted fetus became a prime target of abortion opponents.
Nathan, Fetal Research: An Investigator's View, 22 V.L. L. REV. 384,
386 (1977).
29. In "non-therapeutic" research, although there is potential benefit to others, the data obtained are not used with the intent or expectation of treating an illness from which the patient is suffering. "Nontherapeutic" is not to be equated with "harmful," but is to be contrasted
with "therapeutic" research, which is aimed at providing direct benefit
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research object30 either before, during, or after an abortion. In
August 1974, HEW issued new, and slightly more permissive,
regulations.3 1 The revised regulations were never operative,
however, for in July 1974, Congress enacted the National Research Service Award Act,32 which created the National Com-

mission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and
Behavior Research, and added a new variable to the process of
federal funding for biomedical research.
3.

The Function and Structure of the National Commission

It was (and is) the function of the National Commission to
study and make recommendations with respect to the whole field
of human experimentation, of which fetal experimentation is
merely one small segment.33 Indeed, the National Research Act
contained only two paragraphs relating to fetal experimentation.
Section 202(b) provided:
to the patient. 38 Fed. Reg. 31,739 (1973). In the fetal experimentation
regulations the "patients" are deemed to be both the pregnant woman
and the fetus. Thus, the term "therapeutic" is applied to any research
activity the purpose of which is to meet the health needs of the particular woman or fetus being experimented upon. All other fetal experimentation is categorized as non-therapeutic.
30. U.S. Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare, Protection of
Human Subjects-Policies and Pracedures, 38 Fed. Reg. 31,747 (1973)
(Proposed 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.31-.39).
Among the most significant of those guidelines were the following:
1. A requirement that no non-therapeutic experimentation procedures entailing risk to the fetus to be undertaken in anticipation of abortion. 38 Fed. Reg. 31,747 (1973) (Proposed 45 C.F.R. § 46.37).
2. A statement that in the case of aborted, non-viable fetuses "vital
functions of the abortus will not be maintained artificially for purposes
of research." On the other hand, it was declared equally unacceptable
to undertake experimental procedures which in themselves would terminate respiration and heartbeat. 38 Fed. Reg. 31,747 (1973) (Proposed
45 C.F.R. § 46.35 (b) (2) & (3)).
3. The establishment of an Ethical Review Board whose function
was to approve or disapprove specific proposals on ethical grounds. The
board was mandated to disapprove non-therapeutic research activities
which entailed substantial risk to the fetus. 38 Fed. Reg. 31,741 (1973).
Interestingly, the Ethical Review Board was established under a provision entitled Participationof Children in Research.
31. U.S. Dep't of Health, Education, & Welfare, Protection of
Human Subjects-Policies and Procedures, 39 Fed. Reg. 30,653 (1974)
(Proposed 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.301-.310).
32. Pub. L. No. 93-348, 88 Stat. 342 (codified in part in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.). Sections 201-05, in which Congress created the
National Commission and prescribed its composition and duties, have not
been codified.
33. National Research Service Award Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93348, tit. 2, §§ 202-203, 88 Stat. 348.
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The Commission shall conduct an investigation and study of the
nature and extent of research involving living fetuses, the purposes for which such research has been undertaken, and alternative means for achieving such purposes. The Commission shall,
not later than the expiration of [a] 4-month period . . . recommend to the Secretary policies defining the ciTcumstances (if
any) under which such research may be conducted or supported.
Section 213, entitled "Limitation on Research" (and unoffically known as the moratorium section ) provided:
Until the Commission has made its recommendations to the
Secretary pursuant to section 202 (b), the Secretary may not conduct or support research in the United States or abroad on a
living human fetus, before or after the induced abortion of such
fetus, unless such research is done for the purpose of assuring
the survival of such fetus.
The Commissioners-four biomedical scientists, 3 4 three lawyers,35 two "religious ethicists,"3
one psychologist,3 7 and one
prominent minority group representative 3 8-took office on December 3, 1974 . ' On May 21, 1975, after receiving reports on
the various aspects of fetal experimentation from lawyers, 4 0
biomedical scientists, 4 1 and "ethicists,' ' 42 the Commission is43
sued its findings and recommendations.
34. Joseph V. Brady, Prof. of Behavioral Biology, Johns Hopkins
University School of Medicine; Robert E. Cooke, Vice Chancellor for
Health Services, University of Wisconsin; John Kenneth Ryan, Chairman,
Dep't of Obstetrics and Gynecology, Harvard Medical School; Donald
Wayne Seldin, Chairman, Dep't of Internal Medicine, University of Texas
at Dallas Medical School.
35. Patricia King, Prof. of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; David W. Louisell, Prof. of Law, University of California at Berkeley;
Robert H. Turtle, Washington, D.C., attorney.
36. Albert R. Jonsen, S.J., Adjunct Assoc. Prof. of Bioethics, University of California at San Francisco School of Medicine; Karen A.
Lebacqz, Ass't Prof. of Christian Ethics, Pacific School of Religion.
37. Eliot Stellar, Provost of the University and Prof. of Physiological Psychology, University of Pennsylvania.
38. Dorothy I. Height, Pres., Nat'l Council of Negro Women.
39. See Steinfels, The National Commission and Fetal Research,
HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, June, 1975, at 11.
40. See Capron, The Law Relating to Experimentation with the
Fetus, reprinted in COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 13-1 app.;
Wilson, A Report on Legal Issues Involved in Research on the Fetus,
reprinted in COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 14-1 app.
41. See Batelle-Columbus Laboratories, An Assessment of the Role
of Research Involving Living Human Fetuses in Advances in Medical
Science and Technology, reprinted in COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3,
at 15-1 app. [hereinafter cited as Batelle Report]; Mahoney, The Nature
and Extent of Research Involving Living Human Fetuses, reprinted in
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 1-1 app. [hereinafter cited as
Mahoney Report]. See notes 133-47 infra and accompanying text.
42. Papers were prepared by eight "ethicists." Their findings are
discussed in notes 148-79 infra and accompanying text.
43. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 61-88.
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THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION

The significant features of the Commissions' recommendations regarding non-therapeutic 44 experimentation were as
follows:
(1) No non-therapeutic experimental procedures entailing
greater than minimal risk to the fetus can be undertaken in
anticipation of abortion. 45 (Experimentation prior to abortion is
known as in utero experimentation.)
(2) Experimentation during or subsequent to abortion may
be conducted provided that the fetus is nonviable.4 6 However,
"no intrusion into the fetus [can be] made which alters the
duration of life" and "no significant procedural changes [can
be] introduced into the abortion procedure in the interest of
research alone. '47 (Experimentation during or subsequent to
abortion is known as ex utero experimentation).
Both the in utero and ex utero guidelines contained the
following addendum: "Such research presenting special problems related to the interpretation or application of these guidelines may be conducted or supported by the Secretary, DHEW,
provided that such research has been approved by a national
ethical review board." 4
It seems clear that the purpose of the addendum was to
create a device by which, in appropriate circumstances, the ostensibly proscribed research could, in fact, be undertaken.4 9 Unfortunately, the Commission neglected to define-both for the
public and for the proposed national ethical review board-the
circumstances in which avoiding the regulations and permitting
the research would be appropriate. What the Commission seems
to have recommended, therefore, was a return to the anti44. The Commission defined non-therapeutic research as "research
not designed to improve the health condition of the research subject."
Id. at 6.
45. Id. at 74.
46. "Nonviable fetus" refers to the fetus ex utero which, although it is living, cannot possibly survive to the point of sustaining life independently, given the support of available medical technology. Although it may be presumed that a fetus is
nonviable at a gestational age less than 20 weeks (five lunar
months; four and one-half calendar months) and weight less
than 500 grams, a specific determination as to viability must be
made by a physician in each instance.
Id. at 6.
47. Id. at 74.
48. Id.
49. See dissenting statement of Commissioner David W. Louisell,
CoMIvssIoN REPoRT, supranote 3, at 77.
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experimentation regulations of 1973,50 and establishment of a
new Commission that would be empowered to make ad hoc judgments regarding possible waiver of those provisions.

C. THE CURRENT LAW-THE FEDERAL REGULATIONS OF 1975
1.

The Substantive Provisions

On August 8, 1975, the Secretary of HEW promulgated the
Department's adaptation of the Commission's guidelines.5 1
These regulations, which currently govern all HEW-supported
research, in essence provide:
(1) Experimentation prior to abortion: The current regulations track the Commission's recommended ban on any nontherapeutic in utero experimentation entailing "greater than
minimal" risk to the fetus. 52
(2) Experimentation during or after abortion: Whereas the
Commission specified that 20 weeks gestational age was the
upper limit on the strictly circumscribed experimentation it
recommended, 53 the current regulations contain no reference to
gestational age. Instead, they require that no research activities
posing "added risk to the fetus" be conducted "until it has been
ascertained whether the particular fetus is viable. '54 In the
case of the nonviable fetus, the current law liberalizes the Commission's suggested rules in one respect: although the Commission recommended that "no intrusion into the fetus [can be]
made which alters the duration of life,"' 5 the current regulation
permits vital functions to be artifically maintained but only
"where the purpose of the activity is to develop new methods
for enabling fetuses to survive to the point of viability."56
50. See notes 29-30 supra and accompanying text.
51. 40 Fed. Reg. 33,528 (1975), 45 C.F.R. § 46.201-.211 (1976). In
addition to the changes mentioned in text accompanying notes 53-60
infra, the Secretary also modified the Commission's recommendation re-

lating to paternal consent. The Commission had recommended that only
the mother's consent need be obtained for appropriate research, provided
that the father had not objected.

The current regulations provide that

consent must be obtained from the mother and father unless the father's
identity or whereabouts cannot reasonably be ascertained, he is not reasonably available, or pregnancy resulted from rape. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.208.209 (1976).

52. Id. § 46.208 (a).
53.
54.

ComMIssioN REPORT, supra note 3, at 74.
45 C.F.R. § 46.209(a) (1976).

55. COmMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 74.
56. 45 C.F.R. § 46.209(b) (1) (1976) (emphasis added). This regulation further requires that the "purpose of the activity [must be] the
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Maintaining fetal life functions for any other purpose, such as
cancer research,57 or even the development of new methods of
58
prenatal diagnosis of currently untreatable genetic disease
are still prohibited, as are experimental activities that would
themselves terminate the heartbeat or respiration of the fetus59
and those that involve procedural changes in the timing or
method of abortion solely in the interest of research.6 0
Although the language of the regulations makes "risk" a crucial factor in determining the kinds of non-therapeutic research
procedures that will qualify for federal funding, the term is
never specifically defined in the fetal experimentation provisions.01 Read in conjunction with the regulations governing
human subject experimentation generally, however, the current
fetal research regulations-despite their seeming approval of
some non-therapeutic research-could easily be applied to withhold federal support for any such experimentation.
Research proposals involving fetuses are expressly made
subject to the rules governing human experimentation generally.0 2 There the term "subject at risk" is defined as "any
individual who may be exposed to the possibility of injury,
including physical, psychological, or social injury, as a consedevelopment of important biomedical knowledge which cannot be obtained by other means." Id. § 46.209(b) (3). The use of life support
systems as allowed by this provision may well be viewed as a therapeutic procedure, since it holds out the only possible hope that the "dying" fetus will be saved. Under California law, a physician is required
to provide all available life supports to the possibly viable abortus. CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25955.9 (West 1976). A similar Missouri law,
that apparently required life saving efforts in all stages of pregnancy
and whether the fetus was in utero or ex utero, was recently held unconstitutional. Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52
(1976).
57. See note 147 infra.
58. [Dr. David G.] Nathan and Dr. Frederic D. Frigoletto ...
of Harvard said their proposal for the development of a new
medical device called a flexible amnioscope was turned down
by the human experimentation committee at the Boston Hospital
for Women, apparently because the Committee thought it too
risky in the current [anti-fetal experimentation] climate.
Ann Arbor News, May 27, 1975, at 7. See generally Friedman, Legal
Implications of Amniocentesis, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 92 (1974).
59. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.209(b) (2) (1976).
60. Id. § 46.206 (a) (4).
61. The Commission also failed to define "risk," stating only that
"[d) etermination of acceptable minimum risk is a function of the review
process." CoMbussIoN REPORT, supra note 3, at 66.
62. 45 C.F.R. § 46.201 (c) (1976) ("The requirements of this subpart
are in addition to those imposed under the other subparts [including
Subpart A, relating to research with human subjects] of this part.").
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quence of participation as a subject in any research, development, or related activity which departs from the application of
those established and accepted methods necessary to meet his
needs .... "16
The applicability of the general "at risk" standard to fetuses
was affirmed in a recent HEW policy statement in which the
then-Secretary declared that the definition was intended to cover
all subjects of research that were addressed in legislative hearings preceding enactment of the National Research Award
Act 6 4-including, inter alia, experiments on prisoners, incompetents, and fetuses and pregnant women. "The regulations were
intended, and have been uniformly applied by the Department,
to protect human subjects against the types of risks inherent in
these types of activities."6 5
Based on this official interpretation of the regulations it is
reasonable to conclude that any procedure that would be deemed
to put a living infant or adult at risk would also be deemed to
G7
6
put a living fetus-whether in utero or ex utero -at risk.
Viewed in this light, the 1975 regulations are simply a throwback
to the prohibitive 1973 regulations, " s which were expressly
based on the premise that "all appropriate procedures providing
protection for children as subjects in biomedical research must
be applied with equal vigor and with additional safeguards to
the fetus." 69
63. Id. § 46.103(b).
64. See note 32 supra.
65. 41 Fed. Reg. 26,572 (emphasis added) (Statement of David
Matthews, Secretary of HEW, June 24, 1976).
66. The provisions specifically governing research using living, nonviable ex utero fetuses do not speak of risk. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.209(b)
(1976). According to the general human subject regulations, however,
any nontherapeutic procedure by definition places a subject at risk. See
45 C.F.R. § 46.103 (b) (1976). Thus, if HEW's statement that the regulations are to be applied uniformly, see text accompanying note 65 supra,
is taken of face value, risk to the fetus must always be a consideration
in granting or denying federal money for a project.
67. This emphasis on uniformity appears to exclude the interpretation of risk proposed by two of the Commissioners who would only consider the fetus at risk if it had developed the capability to experience
pain. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 84 (Statement of Commissioner Karen Lebacqz, with the concurrence of Commissioner Albert R.
Jonsen).
68. See notes 29-30 supra and accompanying text.
69. 38 Fed. Reg. at 31,742 (1973). Some recent commentators have
reached precisely the opposite conclusion and have criticized the regulations for imposing too little restriction on fetal research. See H-oran,
Fetal Experimentation and Federal Regulation, 22 VILL. L. REv. 325
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The Ethical Advisory Boards

The regulations also establish two "ethical advisory boards"one to advise the Public Health Service and its components and
the other to advise all other agencies and components within
HEW. 70 The Boards are vested with three types of power-rulemaking, advisory, and adjudicatory.
a. Rulemaking Powers
The regulations provide that each Ethical Advisory Board
may, with the approval of the Secretary, establish
classes of [fetal research] applications or proposals which: (1)
Must be submitted to the Board, or (2) need not be submitted
to the Board. Where the Board so establishes a class of applications or proposals which must be submitted, no application or
proposal within the class may be funded by the Department...
until the application or proposal has been reviewed by the Board
and the Board has rendered its advice as to its acceptibility from
an ethical standpoint.71
Because this provision contains no standards for the Boards
to follow in establishing the classes of proposals that must be submitted to them, the regulation potentially gives the Ethical Advisory Boards power to promulgate a rule requiring submission
of all research applications involving fetuses or pregnant women.
(1977); Louisell, supra note 49; Pilon, Cost-Benefit Ethics: The Utilitarian Approach to Fetal Research, 22 VILL. L. REv. 395 (1977).

Although

the failure to define significant terms, see note 61 supra and accompanying text, and the degree of discretion vested in those who will administer
the regulations, see notes 71-72 infra and accompanying text, make all
attempts at deciphering the rules somewhat speculative at this point, the
position that the regulations are "too liberal" is not persuasive. The
commentators who have taken this position also make it clear that they
find abortion morally repellant and believe that any possibility of using
the fetus in non-therapeutic research is objectionable, for it fails to treat
the fetus as a person. More important, the commentators who see the
regulation as clearing the way for unrestricted experimentation did not
consider the interrelationship of the fetal experimentation regulations
and the general human subject regulations, see notes 62-67 supra and
accompanying text, and so did not evaluate their positions in light of the
theory presented in this Article: that if the regulations, as interpreted
and applied, treat the fetus as an actual living person they will violate
the establishment clause.
70. Two Ethical Advisory Boards shall be established by the
Secretary. Members of these Boards shall be so selected that
the Boards will be competent to deal with medical, legal, social,
ethical and related issues and may include, for example, research
scientists, physicians, psychologists, sociologists, educators, lawyers, and ethicists, as well as representatives of the general public. No board member may be a regular, full-time employee of
the Federal Government.
45 C.F.R. § 46.204(a) (1976).
71. Id. § 46.204(d).
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Were the Secretary to approve such a rule, a Board would
have the power to review (and find "ethically unacceptable")
even those applications that qualify for funding under the substantive provisions of the regulations. 72 In the political climate
surrounding the regulations, the Secretary presumably would
not want to act in disregard of the Board's "advice as to [the
proposal's] acceptability from an ethical standpoint."
b. Advisory Powers
In addition, the regulations give the Ethical Advisory Boards
broad advisory powers relating to (a) the ethical issues raised
by individual research proposals or classes of proposals, and (b)
general policies, guidelines, and procedures. 73 The only standard
contained in this provision is that the Board's advice must be
"consistent with the policies and requirements of this [regulation] .,,4

c. Adjudicatory Powers-The Waiver Provision
The current law also retains, but modifies, the Commission's
suggested escape provision under which the Secretary can modify
or waive specific requirements of the regulations, but only "with
the approval of the Ethical Advisory Board after such opportunity for public comment as the Ethical Advisory Board considers appropriate in the particular instance. '7 5 In addition,
unlike the waiver provision recommended by the Commission,
the current regulation contains the following "standards" for
"Modification or Waiver of Specific Requirements":
In making such decisions, the Secretary will consider whether
the risks to the subject are so outweighed by the sum of the
benefit to the subject and the importance of the knowledge to
be gained as to warrant such modification or waiver and that
such benefits cannot be gained except through a modification or
waiver.76
72. For example, the HEW regulations allow maintenance of fetal
life functions if the purpose is to develop techniques that would enable
other nonviable ex utero fetuses to live and develop to the point of viability. Some commentators have expressed the view that any such procedure, for any purpose, is ethically impermissible. See Horan, supra
note 69, at 338; Louisell, supra note 49, at 79-80; Pilon, supra note 69,
at 401. A Board composed of like-minded persons could, through the
Board's review process, thwart the intent of the regulations.
73. 45 C.F.R. § 46.204(c) (1976).
74. Id.
75. Id. § 46.211.
76. Id.
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Upon close scrutiny, it appears unlikely that the waiver
clause, which simply requires the Secretary-and presumably
the Board before giving its approval or disapproval-to employ
a risk-benefit analysis, will ever be the basis for lifting the
prohibitions of the regulations. Against the risk to the fetus,
two benefit factors are to be weighed: (1) The benefit of the
proposed research to the particular fetus being experimented
upon; and (2) "the importance of the knowledge to be gained"
(presumably, its importance to the public at large).
The first factor is not a criterion for waiver of the prohibitions; it merely authorizes the Secretary to permit beneficial
procedures, that is, therapeutic in utero research-an activity already allowed by the substantive in utero regulation. 77 Moreover, any apparent balancing between the second benefit factor
-the importance of the knowledge to be gained-and the risk
to the subject will probably be illusory. Since the regulations
already permit experimentation where "the risk to the fetus imposed by the research is minimal and the purpose of the activity
is the development of important biomedical knowledge which
cannot be obtained by other means,"78 a scientist will be
required to apply for a waiver only if the Secretary or Board
believe that the risk of the applicant's research is greater than
minimal or that the information could be gathered from other
sources such as animal studies. In most such cases, however,
the actual probability and magnitude of the risk will be unknown. Indeed, the very purpose of much fetal experimentation
is to determine the degree to which the fetus is affected by
various types of drugs and other intrusions into a pregnancy. 79
Thus, the Board will be asked to render a judgment in cases
where the risk is believed to be greater than minimal, but the
actual probability and magnitude of harm are unknown. In such
cases, the general human experimentation regulations would preclude federal support for the project unless the applicant could
prove that (1) the risks were so outweighed by the benefits and
the knowledge to be gained as to justify allowing the subject
to accept the risk;8 0 (2) the rights and welfare of the subject
would be protected;8 ' and (3) the subject gave informed con77. 45 C.F.R. § 46.208 (a) (1) (1976).
78. Id. § 46.208 (a) (2).

79. See CommIssIoN

RFPORT,

supra note 3, at 7-15; Mahoney Re-

port, supra note 41, at 1-14 app. to 1-37 app.
80. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(b) (1) (1976).
81. Id. § 46.102(b) (2).
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Since the members of

the Board and the Secretary are directed to consider these elements exactly as they would in the case of any other human
subject,8

4

it is unlikely that any unknown, but possibly substan-

tial, risk to that human subject would be countenanced, however
noble the scientific goal and however great the likelihood of its
achievement.
Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the application of the
substantive regulations and the possibility of their waiver are
to be determined, by and large, by treating the fetus as a living
person. Acting on this principle may prevent much valuable
research. It will also violate the establishment clause.
III.

A.

AN ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE ANALYSIS

INTRODUCTION

The federal fetal experimentation regulations are a classic
example of "morals legislation"-that is, they impose restrictions
on conduct not harmful to other persons in any tangible or
specific fashion. Instead, the law is based almost exclusively on
"moral concern" for the fetus. It is not the purpose of this
Article to revive the Hart-Devlin debates over whether the government can, or should, regulate ethics or morality.88 Rather,
it is the thesis of this Article that this particular piece of "morals
82. Id. § 46.103 (c).

On this view, of course, parents could give in-

formed consent only to the extent that they could give it for any child.
See generally Bennett, Allocation of Child Medical Care Decisionmaking
Authority: A Suggested Interest Analysis, 62 VA. L. REV. 285 (1976).
83. Id. § 46.103(b) (3).
84. See notes 62-69 supra and accompanying text.
85. Compare H.L.A. HART, LAw, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY (1963) with
P. DEVLIN, Tnm ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1959). H.L.A. Hart believes
that the state cannot legislate against conduct which does not harm
others in any tangible or specific manner. Lord Devlin, on the other
hand, believes that society derives its quality from its prevailing moral
code and that it is permissible to legislate for the purpose of enforcing
that morality.
86. Recent Supreme Court decisions, particularly on obscenity, see,
e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Paris Adult Theater I v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973), and homosexuality, see Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976), appear to have answered that
question in the affirmative. The laws in these cases were not, however,
challenged as violations of the establishment clause. For an argument
that anti-obscenity laws are a violation of the establishment clause, see
Henkin, Morals and The Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM.
L. REV. 391 (1963). While it is not the purpose of this Article to examine the religious origins or purposes of laws proscribing obscenity and
homosevuality, such laws could be susceptible to challenge under tre
establishment clause analysis proposed in this Article.

19771

FETAL EXPERIMENTATION

legislation" is, in essence, religious legislation proscribed by the
first amendment's prohibition on governmental establishment of
religion. This conclusion is based on examination of cases in
which the government has sanctioned-or has been requested to
sanction-certain "moral" precepts or practices, and the governmental involvement has been challenged on establishment clause
grounds. The cases indicate that "morals" legislation will be
deemed impermissibly religious when four factors coalesce:
(1) The legislation puts the authority of government behind a
moral precept or practice that is not buttressed by any societal consensus, but rather is the object of widespread controversy and debate.
(2) If the government lends its support to the precept or
practice, nonadherents (a considerable portion of the population) will be forced to shape their behavior in accordance
with the beliefs of adherents. If the government is not permitted to sanction the practice or precept, however, adherents will not be forced to shape their behavior in accordance
with the beliefs of nonadherents.
(3) The debate is often waged in religious terms and there is
evidence of strong religious pressures for the enactment of
the particularlaw being challenged.
(4) The law serves no substantial extrinsic secular purpose, that
is, any purpose other than to throw the power of government on one side of a moral debate and to suppress activity
that is inconsistent with the chosen side.

B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOUR FACTORS-THE
GOVERNING CASES

The first amendment bars any law "respecting an establishment of religion."8 7 Professor Gerald Gunther has noted that
"the most common [establishment clause] problems stem from
two methods by which separation between church and state may
be threatened": 8 (1) The government gives aid (usually financial) to an activity conducted by a religious organization (typically a parochial school);89 or (2) The government permits a
religious matter to intrude into a governmental activity.9 0 The
federal fetal experimentation regulations fall within the second
87. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
88.

G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

1452 (9th ed. 1975).
89. See, e.g., Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
90. See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Abington
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421 (1962).
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category. The government has permitted a moral matter, which
will be shown to be religious, 91 to intrude into government funding of scientific research.
Of course, "virtually every normative judgment is potentially traceable to one or more ultimate premises, that could be
deemed religious. ' 92 For example, "[1]aws punishing homicide
or theft, though they, too, may have religious roots by way of
notions of natural law and the Bible (we still refer to them
as malum in se), are obviously within the power of the most
secular state ....
That certain religious groups adhere to the
premise underlying the challenged law thus should not automatically lead to an adjudication of constitutional infirmity. Therefore the. "morals legislation" cases in which the establishment
clause issue has been raised must be examined to determine what
elements have led the courts to conclude that statutes embodying certain "moral" precepts and practices are impermissibly
religious.
The landmark cases involving the intrusion of religious
matters into governmental activities were Engel v. Vitale,94 in
which the Supreme Court invalidated a school board rule requiring daily recitation of "nondenominational" prayer in the public
schools, and Abington School District v. Schempp,95 in which
the Court held that the establishment clause prohibits state laws
requiring Bible readings and the recitation of the Lord's Prayer
at the opening of each school day. Neither case gives much guidance in distinguishing religious from nonreligious morals legislation, however, because the Court simply stated, categorically,
that the challenged practices were religious.9 6 Cases involving
"93

91. See notes 167-80 infra and accompanying text.
92. Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term--Foreward: Toward a
Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARv. L. REV.
1, 23 n.106 (1973).
93. Henkin, supra note 86, at 408.
94. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
95. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
96. InEngel, Justice Black stated:
There can, of course, be no doubt that New York's program of
daily classroom invocation of God's blessings as prescribed in
the Regents prayer is a religious activity. It is a solemn avowal
of divine faith and supplication for the blessings of the Almighty.
The nature of prayer has always been religious, none of the respondents has denied this, and the trial court expressly so found.
370 U.S. at 424-25.
Similarly in Abington School District, the majority opinion, as well
as two concurrences, rejected out of hand the notion that the Bible was
"non-sectarian, merely a textbook of morals." 374 U.S. at 270. Justice
Clark's opinion for the Court simply noted that "surely the place of the

1977]

FETAL EXPERIMENTATION

evolution, Sunday closing laws, and sex education, in which the
religious nature of the controversy was much less apparent,
are better aids to establishment clause analysis of the fetal experimentation regulations.
In Epperson v. Arkansas, 97 the Supreme Court invalidated
an Arkansas statute which prohibited any public school or university from teaching the doctrine that "mankind ascended or
descended from a lower order of animals." The Court found an
impermissible establishment of religion because (1) the "Monkey
Law" gave governmental imprimatur to a particular religious
precept and employed an organ of government (the schools) to
ensure that that precept became state policy; and (2) there was
no plausible secular justification for the law.
The overriding fact is that Arkansas law selects from the body
of knowledge a particular segment which it proscribes for the
sole reason that it is deemed to conflict with a particular religious doctrine; that is, with a particular interpretation of the
Book of Genesis by a particular religious group.
No suggestion has been made that the Arkansas' law may be
justified by considerations of state policy other than religious
views of some of its citizens. It is clear that fundamentalist 98
sectarian conviction was and is the law's reason for existence.
The above-quoted statements are, however, somewhat disingenuous. While it is true that the state did not advance any
secular justifications for its law, the Court itself clearly recognized that there were at least two possible nonreligious moral
and ideological objections to teaching evolution in the schools.
First, as noted by the majority, some opponents of Darwinism
believed that it contradicted accepted social and moral ideas to
suggest that mankind had descended from "lower" forms of life
and that the notion that man had "simian rather than seraphic
ancestors" was tantamount to a libel of the human race.9 9 Second, as Justice Black observed in his concurrence, "it may be
that the people's motive was merely . . . to remove this controversial subject from the schools." 10 0 Since both of these
justifications may spring from social, moral, and ideological considerations-rather than from purely religious ones-what led
Bible as an instrument of religion cannot be gainsaid." Id. at 224. Justice Brennan's concurrence stated that the religious nature of Bible reading was "plain," id. at 266, and Justice Goldberg declared that it was
"unmistakable," id. at 307.
97. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
98. Id. at 103, 107-08 (footnotes omitted).
99. Id. at 102 n.10.
100. Id. at 112-13.
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the Court to conclude that "fundamentalist sectarian conviction
was and is the law's reason for existence"? 10' In support of its
conclusion the Court offered only newspaper ads and letters from
the public stating, inter alia, that teaching evolution would be
"subversive of Christianity" and the fact that a Tennessee anti10 2
evolution law had stated a religious purpose in its preamble.
These particular historical facts do not, on their face, seem
overwhelmingly supportive of the Court's conclusion. The admittedly religious purpose of an earlier Tennessee law does not
seem highly probative of the purpose of a later Arkansas law.
Moreover, the religious motivation of some citizens who supported the law does not conclusively establish that the legislators were influenced by those considerations. The questionable
relevance of this legislative history, coupled with the possible
nonreligious moral and social justifications for the law led one
group of authors to ask whether the Court was "psychoanalyz[ing] the legislators."' 0
On balance, however, the Epperson majority seems to have
been correct, even though its conclusion could be reached only
by second-guessing legislative motivation-long considered inappropriate in constitutional decisionmaking.' 0 4 The anti-evolution law suppressed scientifically and intellectually significant
information merely because one segment of society found the
material offensive. Moreover, there is some evidence, although
certainly not conclusive proof, that the legislature was motivated
by religious pressures. One possible analysis of Eppersonalthough not one explicitly adopted by the Court-is that the
facts at hand created a presumption of an establishment clause
violation, a presumption that the state could overcome only by
demonstrating that the law served a substantial purpose extrinsic
101. Id. at 108.
102. Id. at 108-09.
103. W. LOCKHART,
1146 (3d ed. 1970).

Y. KAMISAR, & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

104. See Note, Legislative Purpose and Federal Constitutional Adjudication, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1887 (1970) and cases cited therein at n.1.
But see Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional

Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970). Professor Ely offers a three part test
for judicial inquiry into religious motivation: (1) "the court should not
intervene on the basis of impact [on religion] per se"; (2) "the court
should intervene only on the basis of proof of an intention to favor or
disfavor religion relative to non-religion, or one religion relative to
others"; (3) "a choice legitimately justifiable in terms of a nonreligious
and otherwise permissible goal should be upheld, without inquiry into
motivation." Id. at 1313-27.
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to that of fostering a moral or ideological precept. Such a
burden-shifting rule seems necessary if strict separation of
church and state is to be maintained; otherwise, as illustrated
by comparing the Arkansas and Tennessee statutes, religious
groups and spokesmen could impose their views on the rest of
society simply by couching their arguments in secular language.
The purpose of the Arkansas statute, which stated its prohibitions in secular terms,10 5 was almost certainly the same as
that of the earlier Tennessee statute, which forbade teaching
"any theory that denies the story of the Divine Creation of Man
as taught in the Bible."'10 6 The effect was exactly the same.
Only the religious preamble had been deleted. Hence, by careful
statutory drafting, the Arkansas government could impose restrictions on the intellectual and scientific curriculum in state
schools for the sole purpose of supporting a religious precept,
yet avoid giving the courts an apparent establishment clause
basis for invalidating the law. 10 7 Invalidation could come only
after the Court had inquired into-and made a somewhat speculative assessment of-legislative motive. This type of inquiry,
usually considered improper, was absolutely essential in Epperson, because three factors were present.
First, the moral precept underlying the anti-evolution law
was the subject of widespread controversy and debate, and therefore very different from the precepts underlying laws punishing
homicide or theft which, although similarly rooted in the Biblical
tradition, are also supported by a strong rationally based societal
consensus.
Second, enactment of the law forced all those not adhering
to the underlying moral precept (plaintiff Epperson, for example) to shape their behavior in accordance with the beliefs
of adherents. Invalidation of the law, however, did not result
in the converse. In striking down the anti-evolution law, the
Court was simply adopting a laissez-faire position toward evolution. Teachers who rejected the theory of evolution would not
be forced to teach it. Presumably the state of Arkansas would
still be free to protect the rights of anti-evolutionist parents and
students by permitting those students to be excused from any
08
classes in which evolution was discussed.'
105. 393 U.S. at 99 n.3.
106. Id. at 108.
107. See Emerson & Haber, The Scopes Case in Modern Dress, 27
U. Ci i. L. REv. 522 (1960).
108. Cf. Citizens for Parental Rights v. San Mateo County Bd. of
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Third, the debate over evolution had often been waged in
religious terms'0 9 and there was evidence of strong religious
pressure for the enactment of the particular law being challenged.
It is submitted that these three factors created a presumption
of unconstitutional religious motivation which the state could rebut only by demonstrating that the law served an extrinsic secular purpose. Although the Epperson Court did not explicitly
adopt this reasoning, it does explain the Court's result. Moreover, it provides a doctrinal formula that can be consistently
applied to other "moral precept" cases.
Under this proposed test, if the state of Arkansas had wished
to argue that one purpose of the anti-evolution law was to support a nonreligious ideological viewpoint, for example, that the
theory of evolution was a libel of mankind, it would have had
to demonstrate that the libel of mankind was a social harm. Although the danger in such a belief is not immediately apparent,
should the government demonstrate, for example, that people
who believed in mankind's descent from lower forms of life had
a higher incidence of illegal or anti-social conduct than those who
believed that mankind was unique, perhaps an extrinsic secular
justification for the law would be established. Similarly, if the
government wished to allege "avoiding classroom controversy" as
a nonreligious justification, it would have been required to
demonstrate that controversy in the classroom was harmful because it impeded, rather than advanced, learning.
The presumption of unconstitutionality in cases involving
morals legislation would not be impossible to rebut. The Sunday
closing law case, McGowan v. Maryland,1 0 for example, can
be analyzed as one in which the state successfully met its
burden. In that case, the Court rejected an establishment clause
challenge based on the argument that by forcing all businesses
to close on Sunday, "[t] he government was imposing on all the
people the tenets of the Christian religion.""'
The closing
laws clearly involved the same three crucial factors present in
Epperson. First, the laws were not supported by any societal
consensus. Second, the enactment of the law forced those who
Educ., 124 Cal. Rptr. 68, 51 Cal. App. 3d 1 (1975), appeal dismissed, 425
U.S. 908 (1976) (statutory right to remove children from sex education
classes). See also West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943).
109. See Emerson &Haber, supra note 107, at 522-24.
110. 366 U.S.420 (1961).

111. Id. at 431.
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did not observe a Sunday Sabbath day to shape their conduct
in accordance with the tenets of those who did, whereas invalidation of the law would not have reversed the situation. Striking down the law would simply have been adopting a laissez-faire
policy toward the entire issue. Third, the Court frankly admitted that the debate had often been waged in religious terms
and that "the original laws which dealt with Sunday labor were
motivated by religious forces." 112 Indeed, the title of the challenged statute was "Sabbath Breaking" and it prohibited both
"profan[ing] the Lord's Day" and "work[ing] on the Lord's
Day." Under the proposed analysis, however, these three factors
would give rise only to a presumption of unconstitutionality,
which the state could rebut by demonstrating that the law served
a substantial extrinsic secular purpose-a purpose other than
choosing sides in the ideological debate over the propriety of
work on Sunday and suppressing activity inconsistent with the
chosen side. The presumption was successfully rebutted in
McGowan. The present purpose and effect of the statute, the
Court stated, was to provide a uniform day of rest and recreation for all persons-a day that families and friends could spend
together without interference from their work schedules. 113
Stressing that Sunday closing laws had been supported by
labor groups and other secular social welfare organizations, the
Court reasoned that the challenged statute served a social good,
extrinsic to any moral or ideological issue, and that this precise
purpose could not be served by any other means.'1 4
112. Id.
113. Id. at 451-52.
114. It is true that if the State's interest were simply to provide for its citizens a periodic respite from work, a regulation
demanding that everyone rest one day in seven, leaving the
choice of the day to the individual, would suffice.
However, the State's purpose is not merely to provide a oneday-in-seven work stoppage. In addition to this, the State seeks
to set one day apart from all others as a day of rest, repose,
recreation and tranquility-a day which all members of the family and community have the opportunity to spend and enjoy together, a day on which there exists relative quiet and disassociation from the everyday intensity of commercial activities, a day
on which people may visit friends and relatives who are not
available during working days.
Obviously, a State is empowered to determine that a restone-day-in-seven statute would not accomplish this purpose;
that it would not provide for a general cessation of activity, a
special atmosphere of tranquility, a day which all members of
the family or friends and relatives might spend together. Furthermore, it seems plain that the problems involved in enforcing
such a provision would be exceedingly more difficult than those
in enforcing a common-day-of-rest provision.
Id. at 450-51 (footnotes omitted). The Court also pointed out that Sun-
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The doctrinal formula drawn from Epperson is also implicit
in cases in which plaintiffs have sought to enjoin sex education
programs as an impairment of parents' and students' free exercise of religion. In those cases the courts were asked to aid in
the enforcement of a moral precept at least partly religiously
based-that the study of human sexuality must encompass more
than the study of reproductive biology and that value-free sex
education is immoral. Although one could well believe this
proposition on nonreligious grounds, state courts have declared
that its judicial enforcement would violate the establishment
clause. In Citizens for Parental Rights v. San Mateo County
Board of Education,"' for example, the California Court of
Appeals held that the challenged program did not violate plaintiffs' right of free exercise of religion because, under the applicable statute, the parents were free to remove their children from
all or any portion of the course. More significantly, the court
stated that had the trial court held to the contrary, that is, had
it used the parents' religious and moral objections as a basis for
a decree prohibiting the sex education program, such a holding
would be an unconstitutional establishment of religion because
"under Epperson the state is required to plan its curriculum on
the basis of educational considerations and without reference to
religious considerations."' 06 Other state appellate courts have
likewise concluded that a decree prohibiting sex education would
117
probably run afoul of the establishment clause.
The sex education cases support the theory that in "moral
precept" cases the courts will, at least implicitly, analyze the
problem as suggested above. First, the moral issues surrounding
sex education are the subject of widespread controversy and debate. Second, if the courts (or legislatures) declare that sex
education in the schools is impermissible, the educational experiences of those who do not adhere to the underlying moral precepts will be shaped in accordance with the beliefs of adherents.
day had come to be regarded as a day apart by "[p]eople of all religions
and people of no religion," id. at 451-52, and stated that "[ilt would
seem unrealistic for enforcement purposes and perhaps detrimental to
the general welfare to require a State to choose a common day of rest
other than that which most persons would select of their own accord,"
id. at 452.
115.

124 Cal. Rep. 68, 51 Cal. App. 3d 1 (1975), appeal dismissed,

425 U.S. 90& (1976).
116. Id. at 82, 51 Cal. App. 3d at 18.
117. See Medeiros v. Kiyosaki, 52 Hawaii 436, 441, 478 P.2d 314, 319
(1970); cf. Hopkins v. Hamden Bd. of Educ., 29 Conn. Supp. 397, 289 A.2d
914 (1971).
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Permitting sex education, however, will not result in the converse. Indeed, the court in Citizens for ParentalRights stressed
that one of the redeeming features of the challenged program
was that objecting parents had the right to remove their children
from all or any portion of the course. Third, the sex education
debate has often been waged in religious terms. In fact, the
plaintiffs in Citizens for ParentalRights and related cases based
their claim for relief squarely on their religious objections to the
program. It is submitted that these three factors created a presumption that deletion of the program would violate the establishment clause.' 1 8
C.

APPLICATION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE TEST TO THE
FEDERAL FETAL EXPERIMENTATION REGULATIONS

1. Governmental Sanction of a Moral Precept that is not
Buttressed by any Societal Consensus
The moral precept which is the raison d'etre of the regulations is that the fetus is a human being."" Acceptance or rejection of this proposition appears to be based on ethical, rather
than scientific, considerations 120 and to dictate conclusively
what one believes are the permissible bounds of fetal experimentation.'-'
118. Because the plantiffs in the sex education cases based their
claims solely on religious grounds, there could be no question of an extrinsic secular purpose for eliminating the programs.
119. See notes 62-69 supra and accompanying text; notes 148-59 infra
and accompanying text.
120. Compare text accompanying notes 133-47 infra with text accompanying notes 148-59 infra.
121. If the fetus were considered in most "moral" respects to be like
any other "group of specialized cells," see Guttmacher, SymposiumLaw, Morality, and Abortion, 22 RUTGERS L. REv. 415, 436 (1968), or
human organ, like a lung or kidney, unaware of its own existence and
unable to feel pain, the permissible bounds of experimentation would
be very different from what they would be if the fetus were thought
to be a human being. As Professor Richard Wasserstrom pointed out
to the National Commission, if the fetus were merely a group of cells
or an organ, there would be no argument against ex utero experimentation, and few against in utero. Wasserstrom, Ethical Issues Involved in
Experimentation on the Nonviable Human Fetus, reprinted in CoMmisSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 9-2 app. [hereinafter cited as Wasserstrom
Report]. (Wasserstrom did not endorse this particular view of fetal
status). If this were the status of a fetus, whatever could be done to a
properly severed human organ that still had certain life capacities, such
as maintaining some of its organ functions, could be done to a non-viable
fetus ex utero before its life functions had stopped. Id.
If, on the other hand, the fetus were considered in most "moral" respects to resemble an animal such as a dog or monkey, then it would
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The "fetal personhood" concept is, of course, not supported
by a societal consensus; widespread moral and religious controversy over that concept has been recognized by the Supreme
Court,122 the United States Civil Rights Commission, 123 many

members of Congress, 124 several of the ethicists who served as
consultants to the National Commission, 125 and most notably by
Professor Lawrence Tribe in his seminal discussion of the
Supreme Court's abortion decision. According to Tribe:
If there were general agreement about a developmental stage as
of which the fetus should be regarded as a human being with
independent moral claims, then the propriety of entrusting its
protection to government would follow from the consensus that
states must have relatively wide latitude in fulfilling their responsibility to protect existing human lives from destruction.
But the reality is that the "general agreement" posited above
simply does not exist. Some regard the fetus as merely another
part of "the woman's body until quite late in pregnancy or even
until birth; others believe the fetus must be regarded as a helpless human child from the time of its conception. These differences of view are endemic to the historical situation in which
the abortion controversy arose. Specifically, the advance of embryology and medicine over the past century and a half rendered
untenable any notion that the fetus suddenly "came to life"
in
a physiological sense at a definable point during pregnancy. 126
127
2. The Coercive Impact of the Regulations

The regulations force those who do not adhere to the
be deserving of more humane consideration. But it still would not be
accorded the full ethical protection given to a human. Under this view,
it would be proper to look upon the fetus as an object to be controlled,
altered, killed, or otherwise used for the benefit of humans. But since
the fetus would have to be accorded the same respect due to "higher"
animals, it could not be subjected to needless cruelty. Id.
Finally, if the fetus were considered to be a "person," then the ethics
of fetal research would be identical to the ethics applicable to experimentation on human beings. Governmental restrictions on such research-in accordance with a "Do No Harm" principle-would appear
to be appropriate. The most reasonable interpretation of the 1975 regulations is that they adopt the third point of view. See notes 62-69 supra
and accompanying text.
122. In Roe v. Wade, 413 U.S. 133, 160 (1973), the Court stated that
the issue of fetal status is a matter of religious controversy and noted
that "the predominant attitude of the Jewish faith .

.

. [and] also the

position of a large segment of the Protestant community" is "that life
does not begin until live birth."
123. "The question of when life begins is a matter of religious controversy and no choice can be rationalized on a purely secular premise."
RIGHT TO LIMIT CHILDBEARING, supra note 27, at 31.
124.
125.

See Lowe, supra note 28, at 352.
See notes 148-59 infra and accompanying text.

126. Tribe, supra note 92, at 22.
127.

The Supreme Court has stated that "the Establishment Clause,
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premise of fetal personhood to conform their behavior to the beliefs of adherents. Invalidation of the regulations would not,
however, result in the converse. That is, if the courts were to
strike down the regulations, only those scientists who chose to
do so would seek federal funding for projects involving experimental use of the fetus. Moreover, the government would certainly remain free to require that no pregnant woman planning
an abortion be coerced into participating in such an experimentthat voluntary, unpressured, informed consent be obtained in
every instance. The government would thus be adopting a
laissez-faire policy. Neither the pro-personhood nor the antibe forcing their views on the remainpersonhood groups would
128
ing segments of society.
3.

Evidence of Strong Religious Pressures for Enactment of the
Law

Unlike Epperson, where the recorded legislative history of
the anti-evolution statute was scant, 129 the written history of
the fetal experimentation regulations is extremely lengthy. Dr.
Mark Frankel suggests that the controversy was sparked by a
unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any showing of
direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws
which establish an official religion whether those laws operate directly
to coerce nonobserving individuals or not." Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962); accord, Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
Other establishment clause cases, however, seem to recognize that coercion is one of the harms that the clause was designed to remedy. In
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), for example, the Court, in
distinguishing Sunday closing laws from statutes permitting religious instruction in the public schools, noted that the latter "had the effect of
coercing the children to attend religious classes; no such coercion to attend church services is present in the situation at bar." Id. at 452.
128. This "non-coercion" analysis explains why the Court's judgment
in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 133 (1973), was not an establishment of religion.
Certainly Roe did not result in anyone's being forced to participate in
an abortion. Indeed, under a 1974 amendment to the Health Programs
Extension Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (c) (Supp. V 1975), federally-funded
hospitals and other medical facilities are permitted to assert a religious or
moral conviction against performing either sterilization or abortion procedures. In Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hospital, 523 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 948 (1976), the Ninth Circuit sustained the validity
of that law. It seems that Roe, coupled with the Church Amendment
and Taylor, offers the ultimate in government assurance that neither
pro- nor anti-abortion persons or institutions will be forced to shape
their behavior in accordance with the dictates of the opposing faction.
It would certainly not be difficult for the government to adopt a similar
stance with respect to fetal experimentation.
129. See text accompanying notes 101-02 supra.
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front page story in the April 10, 1973 issue of the Washington
Post:
The story revealed that the "possibility of using newly-delivered
human fetuses

. . .

for medical research before they die is being

strenuously debated by federal health officials."
The news account prompted a barrage of phone calls to the
NIH protesting against the possible use of live fetuses for research. One of those phone calls was from the principal of the
Stone Ridge Country Day School of the Sacred Heart, [a Catholic school] located very near to the NIH, who indicated that the
school's students were organizing a "protest picket" to symbolize
their objection to fetal research. Upon learning of the students'
plans, NIH officials offered to meet with them the following day.
At a public meeting attended by the press, a prepared statement
by Robert Berliner, NIH Deputy Director for Science, was read,
which denied that NIH was supporting research on live aborted
fetuses, and further, that130it did not contemplate approving the
support of such research.
The initial story that the NIH was considering the support
of live fetal research was bitterly attacked by prominent antiabortion groups. A spokesman for the executive committee of
the United States Catholic Conference expressed his "shock" and
commented that "(i) f there is a more unspeakable crime than
abortion itself,

...

it is using victims of abortion as living

human guinea pigs." The Catholic Bishops' Ad Hoc Committee
on Population and Pro-Life
Affairs considered the matter "cause
13
for moral outrage." 1

In addition to the public pressures that seem to have influenced the promulgation of the regulations, the official history of
the regulations reveals a strong religious bias among those who
were commissioned to advise the promulgators. The official
record is contained chiefly in two documents-the Commission
Report and an appendix to that Report comprised of papers submitted to the Commission by its sixteen consultants. Inasmuch
as current HEW regulations are very similar to the recommendations of the Commission, and because the text of the regulations contains both the Commission report and excerpts from
most of the consultants' reports, it can be assumed that the regulations have the same moral and philosophical underpinnings
as the Commission Report. The following sections of this Article will discuss (a) the reports of the Commission's scientific
consultants, and (b) the writings and recommendations of the
Commission's ethical consultants. The contrast between the two
presents a classic illustration of Bertrand Russell's observation
about science and Christianity:
Christian ethics is in certain fundamental respects opposed to the
scientific ethic ....

Christianity emphasizes the importance of

130. Frankel, supra note 23, at 216.
131. Id. at 218 (footnotes omitted).
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the individual soul, and is not prepared to sanction the sacrifice
of one innocent man for the sake of some ulterior good to the
majority. Christianity, in a word, is unpolitical, as 32is natural
since it grew up among men devoid of political power.1

a. The Reports of the Commission's Scientific Consultants
The task of the Commission's two chief scientific consultants,
Batelle-Columbus Laboratories 133
' and Dr. Maurice J. Mahoney
of Yale Medical School,134 was to study the nature and extent
of research involving fetuses and to evaluate its contributions
to biomedical progress. The Batelle Report examined the history
of four biomedical advances achieved through fetal research in
order to determine whether the same results could have been
obtained by other means. Based on Batelle's findings the
Commission concluded that a ban on fetal research or its postponement to await study on appropriate animal models would
have "significantly delayed or halted indefinitely" the development of medical knowledge and techniques in three of the four
areas studied:' 3 5 prenatal diagnosis of genetic defects through
amniocentesis; 13 6 prevention, diagnosis, and treatment of RH
isoimmunization disease;' 3 7 and management of respiratory dis132. B. RUSSELL, THE SCIENTIFIC OUTLOOK 234 (1931).
133. See note 41 supra.
134. Id.
135. CommissIoN REPORT, supra note 3, at 24.
136. Amniocentesis is a technique for obtaining a sample of the am-

niotic fluid that surrounds the fetus in the womb by inserting a needle
through the pregnant woman's abdomen and into the amniotic sac. Analysis of the fluid has become increasingly important in the diagnosis
and management of sex-linked diseases, chromosomal abnormalities,
metabolic disorders (Tay-Sachs disease is the most well-known of
these), and Rh isoimmunization. Battelle Report, supra note 41, at 15-25
app. to 15-34 app. Amniocentesis also enables physicians to determine
the gestational age of a fetus in cases in which the pregnancy must be
terminated early if the child is to survive. Id. at 15-32 app. Amniocentesis is probably best known to the lay public as a means of detecting
the chromosomal abnormality that indicates Down's Syndrome (mongoloidism) in the pregnancies of older women. See generally Friedman,
Legal Implications of Amniocentesis, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 92 (1974).
137. Rh immune disease occurs when "red cells from an Rh positive
fetus cross the placenta and provoke an immune response from an Rh
negative mother. Her anti-Rh antibodies then enter the fetus, destroying
its red cells, and stimulating abnormally high production of immature
red cells, or erythroblasts." Battelle Report, supra note 41, at 15-133
app. The condition causes brain damage in the fetus. Many are stillborn. Researchers have developed a vaccine that has proven 100 percent effective in preventing the condition when administered to high-risk
Rh-negative women. The standard treatment for the disease is an intra-

uterine transfusion of red cells into the fetal abdominal cavity. Id. at
15-63 app.
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tress syndrome. " s" The development of rubella (German
measels) vaccine, the fourth area analyzed, could have progressed without experimentation using fetuses. 139 Such experimentation was necessary, however, to test the safety of the
vaccine. By administering the drug to pregnant women who
planned to have abortions and then studying the tissues of the
aborted fetuses, researchers discovered that the vaccine virus
crossed the placenta and infected the fetus. 1 40 As a result of
this research, rubella vaccinations are not administered to pregnant women.

1 41

Dr. Mahoney, after a survey of medical literature reporting results of research involving fetuses, similarly concluded that
without such research scientists could not fill the gaps in medical knowledge about the effect on fetuses of drugs taken by
women during pregnancy: 142
Thus, for intelligent information about drug effects in the fetus,
one requires detailed information about the pharmacokinetics of
drug transfer across the placenta and into various parts of the
fetus, and one requires detailed information on the disposition
of the 3drug both anatomically and metabolically within the
fetus.14
For many of the studies mentioned above, the aborted fetus
from a spontaneous abortion does not provide an adequate research model. For some purposes, e.g., a drug transfer study,
44
the research must start at some interval before abortion starts.1
The development of polio vaccine 145 and of a safe treatment for thyroid disease, 46 although not stressed by the scientific
138. Respiratory distress syndrome is a condition in which the lungs
of a premature infant are insufficiently developed and collapse with the
first breaths taken after birth. Id. at 15-75 app. Forty thousand infants
a year have this condition; 10,000 of them die. Id.
139. Id. at 15-15 app.
140. Id. at 15-14 app.
141.

Id.

142. Recent reviews in the United Kingdom and the United
States document that during pregnancy women take, on the average, six pharmacologic agents ....

The effects of this enor-

mous amount of drug therapy, some physician-prescribed and
some self-prescribed, on a developing fetus are almost entirely
unknown.

In a very real sense the human fetus is incubated

in a sea of drugs. We know very little about the effect of these

drugs on the human fetus or the distribution within the human
fetus.

Mahoney Report, supra note 41, at 1-37 app. (emphasis added).
143.
144.

Id.
Id. at 1-38 app.

145. See Omenn, Scientific Manipulation of the Unborn 14 (paper
presented at ABA/AMA Medicolegal symposium, Las Vegas, 1975) (on
file at MINNESoTA LAW REVIEW).
146. See Chapman, Conner, Robinson, & Evans, Collection of Radio-
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consultants, also supports the view that fetal research has
an indispensible aid to biomedical progress. In addition,
scientists currently believe that "if we could understand
the mother's body avoids rejection of the fetus, we might
147
crucial clues" to an understanding of cancer.

been
some
how
have

b. The Writings and Recommendations of the Commission's
Ethical Consultants
The writings of the Commission's ethical consultants reveal
that the prevailing view was that the fetus is a person, and that
fetal experimentation is inextricably intertwined with our "immoral abortion system." The moral basis for this position is so
closely linked with fundamentalist Judeo-Christian tradition
that it can only be categorized as religious.
(1)

The Fetal Personhood Premise

The crucial inquiry for six of the Commission's eight ethical
commentators was, "what is a fetus?" For each of them the
answer to that question was a moral one and one that conclusively defined the permissible bounds of fetal experimentation.
All six of these consultants began their analyses by categorizing
the fetus as either a person, or a close analogue to a person. Because of their belief in fetal personhood, their recommendations
regarding the permissibility of fetal experimentation were based
largely on what they believed would be permissible human
48

experimentation.1

Dr. Paul Ramsey, who has written a book about fetal experimentation, 1 49 believes that there is no moral distinction between a fetus and any other human being, 150 and that the
active Iodine by the Human Fetal Thyroid, 8 J. CLINICAL

ENDOCRINOLOGY

717 (1948).
147. Omenn, supra note 145, at 14: "If we could understand how the
mother's body avoids rejection of the fetus, we might have crucial clues
to understand how to prevent rejection of organ transplants and to understand why the body tolerates rapidly dividing tumor cells instead of
destroying them."
148. This view was subsequently embodied in the federal regulations.
See notes 62-69 supraand accompanying text.
149. P. RAmsEY, supra note 4.
150. Moreover, always to say "fetus" in discussing the ethics of

fetal research is as question-begging and laden with moral con-
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ethical standards applicable to fetal experimentation should be
the same as those applied to experimentation on children or on
unconscious, dying, or condemned persons. 151 Four othersFather Richard McCormick, 1 52 Rabbi Seymore Siegel, 153 Dr.
LeRoy Walters, 154 and Dr. Richard Wasserstrom' 5 5-believe
that the fetus is a close analogue to a human being. Each of
the four stresses the fetus's potential to become a fully developed
adult. Dr. Marc Lapp6, who finds discussions of fetal personhood "unsatisfactory, because they are either untestable ... inconsistent ...
or irrelevant," nevertheless believes that the
pre-viable fetus, whether in utero or ex utero, is an entity which
"has a legitimate claim on us for protection."'150
Only two of the ethical consultants, Dr. Sissela Bok and Dr.
Joseph Fletcher, reject the fetal personhood premise. Dr. Bok
refuses to assign any categorical status to the fetus. Instead,
her analysis of the ethical issues surrounding fetal experimentation concentrates on the principles that underlie society's concern
with the protection of life.1 57 Because none of the reasons to
preserve life are rationally applicable to the fetus that is to be
aborted in the early stages of pregnancy, she concludes that a
total ban on fetal research based on the supposed humanity of
the subject makes no sense.1 , '8 Dr. Fletcher, on the other hand,
takes the position that the fetus is a "nonpersonal organism,"
troversy as to insist on always saying "person." So I suggest
that "embryonic human being," "fetal human being," "abortus
human being," "neonatal or newborn human being" grasp rather
well the reality we are to talk about, precisely because the stage
of development is properly placed in an adjectival, not substan-

tive, position.

Id. at xx (emphasis added).

151. Ramsey, Moral Issues in Fetal Research, reprinted in COMMIssioN REPORT, supra note 3, at 6-10 app. [hereinafter cited as Ramsey
Report].

152. McCormick, Experimentation on the Fetus: Policy Proposals,

reprinted in COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 5-2 app. to 5-3 app.
[hereinafter cited as McCormick Report].
153. Siegel, Experimentation on Fetuses Which are Judged to be
Nonviable, reprinted in COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 7-2 app. to
7-3 app. [hereinafter cited as Siegel Report].
154. Walters, Ethical and Public Policy Issues in Fetal Research, reprinted in CoMMissioN REPORT, supra note 3, at 8-6 app. to 8-8 app.

[hereinafter cited as Walters Report].
155. Wasserstrom Report, supra note 121, at 9-2 app., 9-3 app., & 9-9
app.
156. Lapp6, BalancingObligationsto the Living Fetus with the Needs
for Experimentation, reprinted in COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at
4-2 app. [hereinafter cited as Lapp6 Report].

157. Bok, Fetal Research and the Value of Life, reprintedin CoMRnsSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 2-5 app. [hereinafter cited as Bok Report].
158. Id. at 2-7 app.
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one which has value only when "its potentiality is wanted" by
its progenitors. The fetus is neither a "patient" nor a "human
subject," he declares, but is precisely and only a fetus. 1 9
(2)

The Immorality of Abortion

Each of the six ethical consultants who believes in fetal
personhood also believes, as a corollary, that abortion is immoral
and that fetal experimentation is inextricably intertwined with
the immoral abortion system. Fetal experimentation, the consultants believe, is both a cause and an effect of abortion. Professor Wasserstrom, for example, starts from the premise that
"abortion, not experimentation upon the non-viable fetus is the
fundamental, morally problematic activity."1 60 Because he believes that a woman must be able to change her mind about her
decision to abort, he cannot condone any risky non-therapeutic
in utero experimentation. Should the woman decide to continue
the pregnancy to term after such experimentation has begun,
the infant born to her may have been injured, a tragedy for the
child, for the parents, and for society. Wasserstrom thus finds
experimentation objectionable because it may, in some cases, be
an "artificial" inducement to carry out the morally problematic
decision to abort.' 6'
Fetal experimentation is, of course, more often an end
product or effect of abortion. Dr. Walters, who objects strongly
to this connection, illustrates his point with the following
analogy:
In the case of a random homicide, there is generally no ethical
objection to the use of organs from the deceased for transplantaHowever, if a particular hospital became
tion purposes ....
the beneficiary of an organized homicide-system which provided
a regular supply of fresh cadavers, one would be justified in
of the hospiraising questions about the moral appropriateness
62
tal's continuing cooperation with the suppliers.1
u6 3
To Rabbi Siegel, the guiding principle is a "bias for life,'
which requires first that life (including prenatal life) be sustained where it exists and second that any individual life (again,
including prenatal life) presently in being be given precedence

159. Fletcher, Fetal Research: An Ethical Appraisal, reprinted in
COMMIssION REPORT, supra note 3, at 3-3 app. to 3-5 app. [hereinafter

cited as Fletcher Report].
160. Wasserstrom Report, supra note 121, at 9-3 app.
161. Id. at 9-9 app. to 9-10 app.
162. Walters, supra note 4, at 41. This argument, of course, assumes
its conclusion: abortion is homicide and an abortus a cadaver.
163. Siegel Report, supra note 153, at 7-1 app.
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over life that might come afterwards. Dr. Ramsey finds abortion
ethically objectionable and society therefore "collectively guiltladen."' 0 4 He believes that one reason for society's desire to
make scientific experimental use of the fetus is to compensate
for its guilt, that is, to derive some good out of evil.10 5
(3)

The Guiding Spirit-Judeo-Christian Tradition

An examination of the reports of the Commission's ethical
consultants reveals that the spirit behind the "fetal personhood" premise was predominantly a religious one. The most influential ethical consultant to the National Commission was Paul
Ramsey, Professor of Religion at Princeton University, whose
work is considered the primary "reference point for almost all
the other reasoning in [the] area [of fetal experimentation];
his views are encountered at every turn, even if in efforts
to rebut them."'1 6 Ramsey's major premise is that a fundamentalist Jewish-Christian tradition, which he believes to be the
"foundation of medical ethics to date," ought to govern ethical
67
thinking on the issue of fetal experimentation.'
LeRoy Walters, who describes both himself and Ramsey as
"religious ethicists,"' 68 is explicit about the source of his views
regarding fetal personhood: "For the most part, the JudeoChristian tradition has ascribed a high value to pre-natal human
life .... The primary grounds for this respect have been
theories of ensoulment ("animation"), on the one hand, and a
concern for the protection of innocent life on the other."'0 9
More significantly, Walters believes that fundamentalist religious
thought provides the justification not only for placing a high
value on "prenatal human life" but also for placing a relatively
low value on the medical progress, for example, perfecting tech-

164. P. RAMSEY, supra note 4, at 43.
165. Id.
166. Steinfels, supra note 39, at 12. See also Capron, Book Review,
294 N. ENG. J. MED. 789 (1976).
167. I myself tend to believe that any use of the fetal subject
... would be abuse .... [S]eizing the "golden opportunity" afforded by abortion to exact-and falsely to presume"acts of charity from the fetus as a human research subject...
can only mean a terrible distortion of medical ethics to date, and
of the Jewish-Christian tradition which was the foundation of
its regard for the sanctity of life regardless of its age, condition,
or "expectation of life."
Ramsey Report, supra note 151, at 6-11 app. (emphasis added).
168. Walters, supra note 4, at 33.
169. Id. at 48 (emphasis added).
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niques to prevent death from prematurity, that might result
from the scientific use of the fetus. Quoting from Ramsey's
discussion of Christian and Jewish "pulses," Walters concludes
that "we are not bound to guarantee life to premature infants
at all costs and that there are questions of means, which are at
70
least equally deserving of consideration."'
Rabbi Siegel offered a similar theological answer to the
question of ethical responsibility for nonexperimentation. Siegel's thesis is that fundamentalist Jewish thought, as reflected in
Talmudic literature, would place a higher value on the life of a
soon-to-be-aborted fetus than on the lives or welfare of future
generations:
Experiments for the "good of medicine" or for the sake of the
"progress of knowledge" are not automatically legitimated, if
they cause harm to people now, because someone in the future
might benefit. What comes in the future is what the Talmudic
literature calls "the secrets of the Almighty." This does not
mean that we have no responsibility toward the future. Howhave a greater responsibility to those who are now in
ever, we 171
our care.
That most of the Commission's consultants referred to "JudeoChristian tradition," "theories of ensoulment," and "secrets of the
Almighty" does not inevitably lead to the conclusion that there
was no nonreligious inspiration behind the current law.1'7 2 Professor Richard Wasserstrom, one of the six ethicists who expressed a belief in fetal personhood, or quasi-personhood,
170. Id. at 46. Walters drew this line of reasoning from Ramsey's
book on genetic control in which Ramsey declared:
Anyone who intends the world as a Christian or as a Jew knows
along his pulses that he is not bound to succeed in preventing
genetic deterioration, any more than he would be bound to retard entropy, or prevent planets from colliding with this earth
or the sun from cooling. He is not under the necessity of
ensuring that those who come after us will be like us.... He
knows no such absolute command of nature or of nature's
God ....
[The Christian] will always have in mind the premise that
there may be a number of things that might succeed better but
would be intrinsically wrong means for him to adopt.
P. RAMSEY, FABRICATED MAN:

(1970).

THE ETHICS OF GENETIC CONTROL

29-30

171.

Siegel Report, supra note 153, at 7-1 app. (emphasis added).

172.

Cf. RIGHT To LmIT CHILDBEARING, supra note 27, at 28 n.57:

Norman St. John Stevas, The Right to Life (1964) 117, attempts
to insulate opposition to abortion from religious freedom considerations by asserting that the right to life from the moment of
conception is not religious dogma but a Western philosophic position in opposition to destroying human life. However, a Western philosophic belief in the sanctity of life does not necessarily
embrace the concept of personhood before birth. Cf. Daniel
Callahan, Abortion: Law, Choice and Morality (1970), 307-348
(emphasis added).
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attempted to identify a possible nontheological ethical basis for
a public policy that treats
the fetus . . . in most if not all morally relevant respects like
a fully developed, adult human being. . . . The [nontheological]

argument focuses upon the similarities between a developing
fetus and a newly born infant. In briefest form, the argument
goes as follows. It is clear that we regard a newly born infant as
like an adult in all morally relevant respects. Infants as well as
adults are regarded as persons who are entitled to the same sorts
of protection, respect, etc. But there are no significant differences between newly born infants and fetuses which are quite
fully developed and about to be born. What is more, there is
no point of the developmental life of the fetus which can be
singled out as the morally significant point at which to distinguish a fetus not yet at that point from one which has developed
beyond it and hence is now to be regarded as a person. Therefore, fetuses are properly regarded from the moment of conception as having the same basic status as an infant. And since
infants are properly regarded as having the173
same basic status as
adults, fetuses should also be so regarded.
This developmental thesis does not pass muster as a nonreligious foundation for the anti-experimentation regulations.
Despite its presentation in carefully neutral language, the argument rests, at bottom, on a religious premise. Professor Tribe has
pointed out that science and medicine offer no way to determine
when a fetus has become a person, and that "the only bodies
of thought that have purported in this century to locate the crucial line between potential and actual life have been those of
organized religious doctrine."'1 74 The search for that morally
significant point, therefore, "entails not an inference or demonstration from generally shared premises, whether factual or
moral, but a statement of religious faith upon which people will
invariably differ widely."'175 Wasserstrom's phrasing of the
argument in terms of a developmental continuum does not alter
its essentially religious premise. As Tribe has noted:
More modest theories disavow any certainty as to which event
marks the crucial transition but conclude that conception should
be deemed decisive so as to avoid any risk that, by choosing
a later line, one will mistakenly overshoot the correct point ....
The premise on which [this argument rests]-that there is in
fact a moment, albeit one that human beings may be forever
barred from correctly identifying, after which the fetus must
be considered, in some objective rather than merely conventional sense, an independent human being-is unmistakably religious ....

173.
174.
175.
176.

176

Wasserstrom Report, supra note 121, at 9-1 app.
Tribe, supra note 92, at 20.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 20 n.94.
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Moreover, even if the developmental argument could be
shown to rest on secular principles, it is not logically possible
that it was the ethical foundation for the current anti-experimentation regulations. Governmental adherence to this point
of view would require, contrary to Roe v. Wade, that abortion
177
be treated as murder. Professor Wasserstrom recognized this,
as did one of the Commission's theological consultants, Father
Richard McCormick.
[A] ny policy restrictive of fetal experimentation must find other
grounds (other than present fetal humanity and rights) for its
restrictiveness-at least if legal consistency is to be preserved.
For it is patently ridiculous to stipulate that fetal life may be
taken freely because it is only "potential human life" and yet
to prohibit experimentation on this same "potential human life,"
especially when great178medical benefits may be expected from
such experimentation.
If, however, the ethical basis for fetal experimentation policy
is Judeo-Christian principle rather than a secular jurisprudential
premise, consistency with established legal norms and definitions is not required. For one who starts from a theological
moral absolute, current secular law and the premises underlying
that law are irrelevant to the task of formulating an ethical public policy. 179 Indeed, contravening Roe v. Wade by imposing
the fundamentalist view of personhood-from-conception in one
area of governmental activity might well be viewed as the first
step toward reversing public policy on abortion itself. 180
In any case, it is clear that the ethical consultants, including
the most influential one, waged the fetal experimentation debate
in religious terms. Their reports, read in conjunction with the
informal legislative history of the regulations, show evidence of
a strong religious influence for the enactment of rules premised
177.

"Now, of course, on this view abortion .

.

. raises enormous

moral problems, since it is morally comparable to infanticide and homicide generally. And the morality of abortion per se is beyond the scope
of the present inquiry." Wasserstrom Report, supra note 121, at 9-1 app.
178. McCormick Report, supra note 152, at 5-8 app. (emphasis
added).
179. From no legal "is" can a moral "ought" be drawn-either
in medical or in general ethics. The superiority of the original
NIH guidelines we shall see, is most clearly evident because the
drafters proceeded to reason ethically about fetal research and
the needed guidelines, the Supreme Court notwithstanding. The
inferiority of its subsequent revision is clear from its crucial in-

troduction of legal positivism and the facticity of abortion.
RAMSEY, supra note 4, at 41.
180. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 78 (dissenting statement of Commissioner David W. Louisell); McCormick Report, supra
note 152, at 5-8 app. See also notes 20-28 supra and accompanying text.
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on a fundamentalist Judeo-Christian world view. Had HEW
couched the regulations in terms of "fetal ensoulment" and
"secrets of the Almighty," they almost certainly would have been
unable to withstand an establishment clause challenge. The ethicists' reports indicate that the purpose of the instant regulations
is essentially the same as would be the purpose of a hypothetical
"ensoulment" regulation. The effect on national health needs is
exactly the same. Only the words are different. Thus, by careful
drafting, that is by deleting the "ensoulment," "Almighty,"
"Talmudic," and "Judeo-Christian" language from his excerpts
of the consultants' reports, the Secretary of HEW was able not
only to disregard completely the reports of the Commission's
scientific consultants and to impose substantial restrictions on
the progress of biomedical science, but also to avoid giving the
courts an obvious establishment clause basis for invalidating the
law.
Under the constitutional analysis proposed here, however,
the predominantly religious underpinnings, coupled with the disputed moral premise'"'

and coercive impact

82

of the regula-

tions, create a presumption of unconstitutionality; if the regulations are to survive, they must be supported by a wholly secular
justification.
4. A Searchfor an Extrinsic Secular Purpose
The term "extrinsic secular" will be applied to any anti-fetal
experimentation argument the validity of which does not necessarily depend on the acceptance of the moral (and largely
religious) premise of fetal personhood. If there is any justification for the regulations that retains its force regardless of what
one believes about the moral status of the fetus, such justification will be deemed secular, and the regulations will be constitutionally redeemed.
An examination of the regulations and their ethical premises
reveals two possible extrinsic secular justifications for the provisions. These are (1) the "domino effect" and (2) preservation
of a woman's right to change her decision to undergo an abortion.
a. The "Domino Effect"
According to the "domino effect" argument, if fetal experimentation is permitted, then it is likely that such research will
181. See notes 119-26 supra and accompanying text.
182. See text accompanying notes 127-28 supra.
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set a precedent for the performance of similar experiments on
other powerless or defenseless entities, such as infants or dying
or unconscious adults. 8 3 Although this argument is generally
made only by those who also accept the premise of fetal personhood, 184 one who makes a moral distinction between a fetus
and an actual human being might still worry that investigators,
or perhaps society in general, will come to believe that if fetal
experimentation is morally permissible, then experimentation
on others who are unable to defend themselves is also ethically proper18 5 Once this "domino effect" is set in motion, the
result, it is feared, will be "a reenactment of the 'Nazi situation'
or Brave New World or 1984."1 86
Those who urge this apocalyptic view fail in two respects to
provide a secular justification for prohibitions on fetal research.
First, unlike the situation in McGowan in which there was some
factual support for the proposition that a uniform day of rest
for workers served a social good, 187 there is no evidence that
approval of fetal experimentation leads to insensitivity to the
rights of helpless persons; hence, conversely, there is no factual
support for the proposition that banning such experimentation
serves a social good. Second, again unlike McGowan in which
the state's specific goal could not be attained by any other
reasonable means, 8 8 the precise goal of protecting helpless persons can be achieved by means other than depriving society of
the benefits of fetal research. Thus, a societal consensus that
children or the aged or dying should be protected from abusive
treatment could be enforced by shaping policies specifically to
prevent or halt any such abuses. The two-part counterargument to the domino theory is well stated by Dr. Sissela Bok:
Taken as an empirical argument, it must be seen for what it
is-an inflammatory toying with human fears totally unrelated
to any development seen to have taken place in societies permitting abortion and fetal research. To the best of my knowledge,
available data do not bear out such dire predictions. The societies which have permitted abortion for considerable lengths of
time have not experienced any tendency to infanticide, euthanasia, or Nazi-style experiments on children or adults. The infant
mortality statistics of Sweden and Denmark, for example, are ex183.
184.
185.
186.
course,
187.
188.

See, e.g., Walters Report, supra note 154, at 8-9 app.
See, e.g., id. at 8-6 app. to 8-8 app.; P. RAMSEY, supra note 4.
See Wasserstrom Report, supra note 121, at 9-4 app.
Fletcher Report, supra note 159, at 3-9 app. Dr. Fletcher, of
does not endorse this argument.
See note 113 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 113-14 supra and accompanying text.
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tremely low, and the protection and care given to all living children, including those born with special handicaps, is exemplary.
It is true that facts cannot satisfy those who want a logical
demonstration that dangerous developments cannot under any
circumstances come about. But if they are also trying to warn
of actual risks, the burden of proof rests upon them to show
some evidence of such developments taking place before oppos-

ing a policy which will mean so much to children and their
families, and also to show why it would not be possible to stop
any such development after it begins to take place.' 89

Perhaps the essence of the "domino effect" argument is not that
permitting fetal experimentation leads to brutal treatment of de-

fenseless human beings, but rather that fetal experimentation
is brutal treatment of helpless human beings, 190 which returns
the argument to its religious premise of fetal personhood. The
"domino effect" theory thus fails to provide an extrinsic secular
foundation for the regulations.
b. Preserving a Woman's Right to Change her Decision to
Undergo an Induced Abortion
It is always possible that a pregnant woman who has decided

to have an abortion will change her mind and decide to continue
the pregnancy to term. In utero fetal research, it is argued, inter-

feres with the woman's ability to alter her decision because the
fetus may be injured by the experimentation, making the mother
very reluctant to give birth to the child. Unlike the domino
theory, the change-of-mind rationale is contained in the text of
the Commission's Report' 91 and presumably is one of the bases
upon which the Secretary adopted the Commission's recommendation concerning an almost total ban on non-therapeutic in
utero research.
The possibility of change of.mind does seem to justify the
stringent in utero restrictions-until one looks at the available
data, which indicate that the "problem" is almost nonexistent
and can be solved by other more specifically tailored means. Information submitted to the Commission as a consultant's report
by Dr. Michael Bracken 192 indicates that the number of
women who initially seek an abortion and subsequently change
their minds is infinitesimal. For example, in 1973, at Eastern
189. Bok Report, supra note 157, at 2-13 app. (emphasis added).
190. See P. RAMSEY, supra note 4, at 31-37.
191. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 68.
192. Bracken, The Stability of the Decision to Seek Induced Abortion, reprinted in CoMVIISSloN REPORT, supra note 3, at 16-1 app.
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Women's Center in New York City, out of 7,777 women seeking
abortions, only seven changed their minds.193 Similarly, in
1973-74, at Preterm Clinic in Boston, out of 10,858 women who
initially sought abortions, only 31 subsequently decided to carry
94
the pregnancy to term.1
The women who are at risk of changing their minds are not
only very small in number, but also usually identifiable in the
abortion counseling process. 195 Thus, it appears that the
change-of-mind problem could be solved by disqualifying from
participation in fetal experimentation all women who have not
undergone abortion counseling, as well as those who during the
course of such counseling have expressed either ambivalence
about the impending abortion or difficulty in coping with conflict in general. 19 6 As an added precaution, any investigator
participating in fetal experimentation could be prohibited from
participating in the abortion decision or in the counseling. 197
Clearly the Commission's and Secretary's virtually total ban on
non-therapeutic in utero experimentation is not a reasonable
means available to pursue this secular goal.
Moreover, the change-of-mind argument does not provide
even an ostensible extrinsic secular basis for the ex utero restrictions. The Commission, of course, recognized this, noting that
"[o]nce the abortion procedure has begun, or after it is com193. Id. at 16-5 app. to 16-6 app.
194. Id. at 16-6 app. The remainder of Dr. Bracken's data deal with
persons seeking abortions before Roe v. Wade when the "institutional and
psychosocial environments" were, in many cases "formidable." Id. at
16-5 app. Hence, those earlier change-of-mind rates would have little
bearing on the number of women likely to change their minds in a more
favorable post-Roe abortion climate. It should be noted that the Commission, while making repeated references to the "problem" of maternal
change-of-mind, never once mentioned the Bracken study, which it had
commissioned, and which indicates that maternal change-of-mind is a
numerically insignificant problem. Since the text of the Commission's
Report refers to each of the other consultant's reports, the failure to
mention the Bracken study, seems particularly significant.
195. "Abortion counseling is a crucial procedure for selecting out of
the clinic population women who are at increased risk of changing their
decision to abort. An invitation to participate in a research project
should only follow, and should be independent of, routine abortion
counseling." Id. at 16-17 app.
196. "Women more at risk of changing their decision to abort are
more likely to be characterized by psychological than by demographic
factors. The style of coping with conflicts during decision making,
rather than simply the presence of conflict, is more likely to predict late
changes of decision." Id. at 16-16 app.
197. See note 195 supra.
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pleted, there is no chance of a change of mind on the woman's
part which will result in a living, injured subject."' 98 How
then did the Commission justify its stringent restrictions on ex
utero research? The answer is that the Commission justified the
prohibition by resorting to respect for the "dignity" and "integ-

rity" of the aborted fetus which, the commissioners believed, is
indistinguishable from a dying human being:
[W]hile questions of risk [of harm or injury to a fetus
which is in the process of being, or already has been, aborted]
become less relevant, considerations of respect for the dignity
of the fetus continue to be of paramount importance, and
require that the fetus be treated with the respect due to dying
subjects. While dying subjects may not be "harmed" in the
sense of "injured for life", issues of violation of integrity are
nonetheless central. The Commission concludes, therefore, that
out of respect for dying subjects, no non-therapeutic interventions are permissible which would alter the duration of life of
the non-viable fetus ex utero.199
The Commission's recommendation was adopted by the
Secretary but with one important exception-the ex utero prohibitions are inapplicable where the purpose of the research
activity is to "enable [other] fetuses to survive to the point of
viability. ' 20 0 Paradoxically, however, when the purpose of the

research activity is to help infants, children, or adults-about
whose personhood there is no controversy-then the research
activity is prohibited; for, in such cases, the "dignity" and
"integrity" of the fetal person 20 1 is of "paramount importance."

This is the only stated rationale for the ex utero restrictions;
it can hardly be deemed to have been derived from premises
which are independent of the controverted fetal personhood
rationale.
In sum, "fetal dignity," rather than the likelihood of changing the abortion decision, is at the root of the federal fetalexperimentation prohibitions. For, if the object of concern were
the mother, then all ex utero restrictions would be unnecessary
198. CoMMnssioN REP o T, supra note 3, at 68.
199. Id. (emphasis added).
200. 45 C.F.R.-§ 46.209(b) (1976).
201. The Commission's treatment of the "fetal personhood" issue
contains an interesting paradox. In the "Preface to Deliberations and
Conclusions" the Report states that "the Commission has not addressed
directly the issues of the personhood and the civil status of the fetus."
However, in the same paragraph, indeed in the preceding sentence, the
Commission states that "the belief has been affirmed that the fetus as
a human subject is deserving of care and respect." CoMMIssioN REPORT,
supra note 3, at 61-62 (emphasis added).
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(so long as the mother's consent were obtained). Moreover, in
light of the extremely small number and the identifiability of
women who actually alter their decision to abort, the in utero
ban is so overinclusive that it appears to be arbitrary and without reasonable relation to any end within the competency of the
secular state.

20 2

202. The same constitutional analysis is applicable to state statutes
governing fetal research. The history of the state laws parallels the federal experience. Before Roe v. Wade there apparently were no laws or
regulations directed specifically at research involving fetuses. After
January 1973, however, the legislatures of sixteen states enacted statutes
that regulate fetal research. These laws range from a Louisiana statute
under which any non-therapeutic experimentation on any embryo, fetus,
or abortus, is punishable by a minimum sentence of five years at hard
labor and a maximum sentence of twenty years, LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:87.2 (West Supp. 1974), to a South Dakota statute which prohibits
only "experimentation with fetuses without written consent of the
woman" and does not specify any punishment. S.D. CoMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 34-23A-17 (Supp. 1976).
Eight of these statutes prohibit both in utero and ex utero research:
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-26 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:87.2 (West Supp. 1974); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1574
(West Supp. 1975); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 112, § 12J (Michie/Law. Co-op
STAT. § 145.422 (1976); Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.035 (Cum.
Supp. 1975); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 34-23A-17 (Supp. 1976); N.D.
CENr. CODE § 14-02.2 (Supp. 1975). One proscribes in utero procedures

Supp. 1977); MINN.

only. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-310 (Supp. 1975). Seven appear to be
aimed at ex utero experimentation: CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25956
(West Supp. 1977); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-58.5-6 (Burns 1975); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 436.026 (Baldwin 1975); MONT. Rzv. CODE ANN. § 94-5617(c) (Supp. 1973); NEE. REv. STAT. § 28-4, 161 (1975); OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. § 2919.14, (Page 1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6605 (Purdon
Supp. 1977). Those state statutes which are directed, in whole or in part,
at ex utero procedures appear to be more restrictive than their federal
counterpart. That is, while the federal guidelines permit ex utero experimentation in some (very limited) circumstances, see notes 54-60
supra and accompanying text, most of the state laws proscribe all ex
utero research.
Their flat proscription on research procedures using fetuses indicates
that the state laws are also based on the premise that a fetus is a person
whose dignity, at least, must be protected-a conclusion that can be
drawn only by reference to religious principles. See notes 166-79 supra
and accompanying text. The statutes are also coercive, clearly forcing
nonbelievers to conform their actions to the religious premises on which
the laws are based. Overt evidence of religious influence behind state
statutes is more difficult to supply; unlike the federal regulations, the
recorded legislative history of the state enactments is scant. Epperson
may be of assistance on this point as indicating that when a state statute
is based on a possibly religious premise, informal sources such as newspaper accounts may be considered. See notes 99-102 supra and accompanying text. In any case, if a court could be persuaded to accept Professor Tribe's argument that an establishment clause issue is presented
when "a controversy [is] so structured in a particular social and historical context that no attempt to resolve it in a public forum can avoid
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IV. CONCLUSION
That research using fetuses has led to many significant
medical advances is undisputed. There is also little question that
continuation of such research would aid the development of other
medical knowledge and techniques of great benefit-particularly
to infants. Because medical studies using fetuses are inevitably
linked to abortion, however, the debate over fetal research became a means through which the opponents of abortion could
secure official recognition of their belief that a fetus is a person
from the moment of conception. The current federal regulations,
which were shaped by this controversy, are most reasonably interpreted as requiring that the fetus be treated according to the
same standards as any human subject involved in a scientific experiment.
It is the thesis of this Article that the question of fetal
personhood cannot be resolved through rational inquiry but is
a matter of faith and of religious belief. Moreover, in this
society, it is a belief as to which there clearly is no consensus.
The federal regulations governing fetal research give official
sanction to the disputed premise of fetal personhood and thereby
f rce nonbelievers to conform their behavior to it. More important, both the official and unofficial history of the regulations
strongly suggest that the predominant animus underlying the
law was a religious one. Under the analysis proposed in this
Article, these factors create a presumption that the regulations
represent an impermissible establishment of religion. This presumption may be overcome by showing that a secular purpose,
unrelated to the disputed religious belief, is also served by the
regulations. Examination of the two most commonly urged nonreligious reasons for such restrictions on fetal research, however,
reveals that they are not sufficient to uphold the regulations.
Neither the brutalizing effect on society nor undermining a
woman's ability to change her mind is a significant danger causally related to approval of fetal experimentation. Moreover, each
explicit confrontation with the religious differences that ultimately divide
the disputants," Tribe, supra note 92, at 23 n.106, actual proof of legislative history might be unnecessary. Consequently according to the constitutional analysis suggested in this Article, the state would have the
burden to show that (1) the statute serves a wholly secular purposeone that does not depend on acceptance of the premise of fetal personhood-and (2) that the secular purpose cannot be served by other reasonably available means that do not raise constitutional questions.
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of these interests could be served by more specifically drawn
measures that do not raise constitutional issues.
The only legitimate position for a secular state with regard
to an essentially religious issue such as fetal personhood is one
of neutrality. This principle, in the context of biomedical research, would allow those scientists willing and competent to
carry on valuable research using fetuses to do so, while leaving
those who find such work objectionable for moral or religious
reasons equally free not to participate. Because the federal regulations governing fetal research depart from this principle of
neutrality, they are open to attack as an unconstitutional establishment of religion.

